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Though the impact of deliberative polling on attitude change has received ample 
attention in the literature, micro models of attitude change before, during and after 
deliberation are understudied. The relative strength of three competing views of the 
way attitudes change – the heuristics, systematic and deliberative models – are 
assessed, using the quasi-experimental data of the EuroPolis deliberative project and 
comparing a group of people who participated in the deliberative poll with a control 
group. The results are: 1) in line with the systematic model, predispositions play a 
larger role than in the heuristics or deliberative models; 2) predispositions play a 
different role for participants and non-participants; 3) predispositions shape attitude 
formation in different ways depending on the issue at hand. On some issues the 
beliefs of participants change as a consequence of deliberation and become more 
complex and nuanced than before. This is, however, not the case for immigration 
issues where deliberation seems to strengthen predispositions.  
 












 Introduction  
 
Ever since its inception, the empirical debate about the underlying conditions of 
democratic citizenship has been dominated by the views of ‘democratic realists’. The 
realist perspective is inspired by a minimalist vision of the public’s ability to govern 
itself and stems from four empirical assumptions about the nature of the general 
public: it knows little about politics, it could not care less, it does not understand 
well what is going on at the political stage, and, as a consequence, is easily 
manipulated (Berelson et al., 1948; Converse, 1964; Sniderman et al., 2000). Scholars 
of the realist perspective therefore pessimistically conclude that the public’s role in 
public policy should be drastically curtailed in favor of political elites who are 
considered the only true torchbearers of democracy (Stouffer, 1955). The sole task 
trusted to citizens is the limited one of choosing among competing elites. The main 
purpose of democratic institutions, as far as responsiveness is concerned, is to 
constrain the public and to channel its potentially dangerous tendencies through 
political representation.  
This realist vision of democracy has been opposed by an alternative perspective: 
the participatory or revisionist one. It argues in favor of the possibility – indeed the 
need – to reassess the public’s ability to express its political preferences and 
thoughts (Dahl, 1956; Pateman, 1970). Revisionists turn the problem of citizens’ 
capacities upside down, laying the problem at the door of institutions. They believe 
it is the task of political theory to devise democratic institutions able to unbridle 
human capacities through deliberation, so as to allow people to live up to the 
standard of the homo politicus. Given the opportunity, citizens are perfectly capable 
of managing complex information and contradictory evidence.  
A systematic empirical research program has been developed since the turn of 
the century to explore both elements of the debate on which realists and revisionists 
battle: the bleak empirical assumptions about the capacities of the public and the 
role credited to deliberative institutions in shaping, fostering, or otherwise affecting 
public opinion. The two camps, however, have rarely met but rather talked past one 
another. In this paper, we make an effort to combine these two strands of thinking. 
Exploiting the unique research design of the EuroPolis project we explore whether 
and how a deliberative environment – which is purposely designed to address some 
of the shortcomings blamed on citizens, namely their lack of information and 
interest – affects the way these very attitudes develop. We contrast three 
alternative theories on how people form, and consequently change, their opinions. 
One focuses on the role of heuristics in explaining attitude change, the second 
credits the public with deliberative capacity in forming their attitudes, and the third 
focuses on changes in the quality and the amount of information available as a result 
of deliberation.  
Our findings are threefold. First, we find that in line with the systematic model 
predispositions play a larger role than the heuristics or the deliberative models are 
ready to concede. Second, predispositions play a different role for participants and 
non-participants. Third, predispositions play a different role in attitude formation 
depending on the type of issue. When issues are more technical, (e.g. the EU or 
climate change) the beliefs of participants change as a consequence of deliberation 
and become more complex and nuanced than before. By contrast, when the debate 
pertains to more emotive issues, such as immigration, deliberation strengthens pre-
existing beliefs. 
 
Opinion formation and attitude change: heuristics, systematic or 
deliberative model?  
 
Two main lines of development can be distinguished in the study of public attitudes. 
Both these lines have evolved over time and they have converged to a greater extent 
than was initially conceivable. A first line of research focuses on the individual and 
her capacities. The gloomy characterization of the public, as affected by instability, 
irrationality and emotion (Converse, 1964), has been challenged in a reevaluation of 
the cognitive ability of the public to compensate for its lack of information by relying 
on heuristics and other cognitive shortcuts (Popkin, 1991; Sniderman et al., 1991). 
Two distinguished examples of these alternative views have been presented by 
Zaller in the 1990s and by Sniderman et al. in the early 2000s.  
A second line of research focuses on the role of institutional practices in either 
facilitating or obstructing the process of discovery, formation, and expression of 
public preferences. From an institutional mechanism of registration, simplification, 
and ultimately conversion of demands into political outcomes, democracy has 
increasingly become an arena for discussion and deliberation. Through a continuous 
debate between political representatives, experts, and the media, democracy has 
gained the ability to transform the preferences of each group of actors in such a way 
that the quality of the democratic process itself is improved.1  
A logical step in this dialogue has been that of merging the two lines of research 
(Jackman and Sniderman, 2006a; Sniderman et al., 2001; Zaller, 1992). Our research 
can finds its place in this interwoven tradition as we assess whether and how 
institutions designed to create optimal deliberative conditions (such as deliberative 
polls) interact with citizens’ skills in reasoning and ultimately affect the way their 
very attitudes are formed and subsequently change. We start with a discussion of 
the so-called RAS (Reception–Acceptance–Sampling) model which offers a clear and 
theoretically grounded explanation of how people change their attitudes.  
 
The heuristics model  
The RAS model of attitude formation and attitude change – also referred to as the 
heuristics or situational model – can be broken down into three main elements: 
predispositions, political awareness and the informational context. Predispositions, 
defined as ‘stable individual-level traits that regulate the acceptance or non-
acceptance of the political communications that a person receives’ (Zaller, 1992: 22), 
are the critical intervening variable between messages people encounter in the mass 
media and their expression of their own political preferences.2  
Political awareness is ‘the extent to which an individual pays attention to politics 
and understands what he or she has encountered’ (Zaller, 1992: 21). Awareness is 
the single most important source of attitude change in the RAS model (Zaller, 1992: 
37).  
                                                        
1 For some references to this literature see Bobbio (2002), Checkel (2001) and Elster (1998).  
2
 Political predispositions are formed through personal experiences (e.g. early socialization), 
personal and social location, and so may be considered as ‘inherited’.  
The third element is the context (of communication). Zaller is a complete 
externalist in his view of where opinions come from. Citizens depend on political 
elites (broadly defined to include politicians, high level officials, journalists and policy 
experts) for most of their information, and the information reaching them is ‘(...) a 
highly selective and stereotyped view of what has taken place’ (Zaller, 1992: 7). The 
most important characteristic of the information environment is how information is 
distributed, i.e. whether the public ‘(...) is permitted to choose between alternative 
visions of what the issue is’ (Zaller, 1992: 8) or rather whether there is no such 
choice.  
Predispositions and awareness come together in a two-step model of attitude 
change (Zaller, 1992: 281). The first step, reception, is a function of political 
awareness. ‘The greater a person’s level of cognitive engagement with an issue, the 
more likely he or she is to be exposed to and comprehend – in a word, to receive – 
political messages concerning that issue’ (Zaller, 1992: 42). The second step, 
acceptance, is a function of both awareness and predispositions: ‘People tend to 
resist arguments that are inconsistent with their political predispositions, but they 
do so only to the extent that they possess the contextual information necessary to 
perceive a relationship between the message and their predispositions’ (Zaller, 1992: 
44).  
The informational context is relevant for two reasons. First, at the reception 
stage, more politically attentive citizens are more likely to understand the political 
nature of the message. According to Zaller, however, political awareness only helps 
people to figure out the source of the message. Awareness does not help the listener 
to understand the content of a message. His model, as Zaller himself puts it, ‘makes 
no allowance for citizens to think, reason, or deliberate about politics: If citizens are 
well informed, they react mechanically to political ideas on the basis of external cues 
about their partisan implications, and if they are too poorly informed to be aware of 
these cues, they tend to uncritically accept whatever ideas they encounter’ (Zaller, 
1992: 45).  
Second, at the acceptance stage, attitude change depends on the distribution of 
information; on whether messages are one-sided or two-sided. In one-sided 
information environments messages are overwhelmingly in one direction. In a two-
sided information environment messages – with different levels of intensity – come 
from opposing sources. In both environments, the more aware are better able to 
grasp the cues which can be picked up from the media or political elites, but with 
different effects. In one-sided information environments, people all (i.e. irrespective 
of their political color) move in the same direction based on their level of political 
awareness (mainstream effects). In a two-sided environment, we witness 
polarization. The better aware move more clearly in the direction of their cueing 
sources. For Zaller, attitude change is, in a way, empty-headed. Attitudes change 
only because messages change. There is, in sum, not much space for deliberation in 
the heuristics model.  
 
The systematic and deliberative models  
Two lines of criticism have been raised against the heuristics model. The first 
revaluates the role of predispositions in both the reception and acceptance stage. 
Sniderman’s work is a good example of this approach. The contrast with Zaller hangs 
on two issues, both related to the role of predispositions. First, while Zaller does not 
allow for predispositions to play any role at the reception stage, letting political 
awareness make all the traction, Sniderman et al. (2001) contend that 
predispositions affect the way people perceive (and react to) stimuli . They argue, 
first, that if predispositions ‘represent a systematic tendency to respond consistently 
to a social or political object, with individuals reliably differing from one another 
depending on how positive or negative their attitude happens to be’, then social 
cues will lead to stronger reactions among those who have stronger predispositions 
(Sniderman et al., 2001: 265).  
Second, Sniderman claims that people engage with the information environment 
in an active way. The content of the message makes as much a difference as (or 
perhaps even more than) the source. Awareness helps to put the cueing message in 
line with someone’s predispositions, but predispositions in turn not only help people 
understand who is saying something, but also what is being said. Combining these 
two pieces of information, Sniderman suggests that predispositions and situations 
(i.e. contexts) interact in complex, nonlinear, ways, depending also on the level of 
awareness. In particular, contrary to what Zaller would expect from a deliberative 
environment, the Sniderman model suggests that the complexity of the information 
environment in deliberation should strengthen, rather than depress, the role of 
predispositions in orienting people’s preferences.  
The second line of criticism comes from empirical deliberative theory. Change in 
the quality and amount of information as well as in the variety of arguments 
produces changes in attitudes. Contrary to previous models, the deliberative one 
focuses on the ‘considered judgments’ of citizens, defining these as ‘a cognitive 
process in which individuals form, alter, or reinforce their opinions as they weigh 
evidence and argument from various points of view’ (Lindeman, 2002: 199). 
Evidence and arguments are the two key components of this model. The increase in 
the amount and quality of information available is the single most studied effect of 
deliberation and the most beneficial outcome credited to it (Andersen and Hansen, 
2007; Fishkin, 2009; Luskin et al., 2002; Set l  et al., 2010; Sturgus et al., 2005). 
Arguments and argumentation are seen as a distinct and unique component of 
deliberative reasoning (Mercier and Landemore, 2012) making it different from 
other forms of thinking. Both contribute to the transformative power of 
deliberation, a key assumption of deliberative theory. At the heart of this 
assumption is the idea that individuals who participate in a deliberative process will 
be transformed, due to the effect of both evidence and arguments, into more 
enlightened citizens: i.e., be more informed, more rational, more tolerant towards 
other perspectives, and better able to find a common ground with others and to 
reach a public spirited decision.  
The task that we set ourselves in this paper is to explore how people perform in 
the two crucial stages of attitude change: reception and acceptance. We do so in an 
environment in which the information context is optimal in terms of intensity, 
familiarity and balance of information. In the next section, we spell out the main 





Hypotheses and expectations  
 
There are two key components in our analysis: one is contextual and the other 
psychological. The contextual component is related to the information environment. 
To study the environment, as the informational crutch on which citizens lean to 
shape their political judgments, two main approaches have been used so far. The 
first takes the natural context for granted and explores how variations in its 
properties affect the public’s performance. As an example, Dobrzynska and Blais 
(2008) look at the way in which attitudes change in an intense electoral campaign in 
Canada. The second, experimental, approach exploits the power of randomization in 
mass surveys’ question wording to explore the way different issue frames affect 
people’s opinion and their cognitive performances (e.g. Jackman and Sniderman 
2006b; Kuklinski et al. 2001; Sniderman et al. 2001).  
In this paper, we draw upon a combination of both approaches, exploiting the 
strength of the EuroPolis quasi-experimental design and compare it with the natural 
conditions created by an election – namely the European Parliamentary elections of 
June 2009 – which is usually considered to be a peak moment in media attention to 
politics. Both environments are characterized by a high intensity of messages. 
Admittedly, European Parliamentary elections are second-order elections (see 
Berhagen and Schmitt 2014 in this special issue), but they are surely rich with 
opposing messages on several topics, among which the EU and immigration stand 
out as prominent issues.  
The two environments are distinguished by the quality and the nature of the 
information. The key component of a deliberative poll is to make the informational 
environment both more balanced and rich in content, depriving people of one of 
their fundamental informational crutches, namely the cues arising from political 
sources. It is not that in deliberation messages intentionally lack their cueing 
component. In fact, both the briefing documents and the moderators of the small 
group discussions explicitly addressed the positions of the different party families on 
the issues discussed. It is the nature and quality of the information provided that 
turns the cueing to content ratio in favor of the latter. In a natural election 
environment, on the contrary, we expect cueing sources to be very prominent in 
political debates. The contrast with EuroPolis allows us to assess the extent to which 
content rather than cues is important in shaping attitudes.  
The second key components in our analyses are the psychological micro-
mechanisms of attitude formation. As discussed in the previous section, from the 
literature we have identified three theoretical models that each focus on different 
key variables to explain attitude formation and change. The heuristics model focuses 
on awareness; the systematic model on predispositions, and the deliberative model 
on knowledge (and the nature of the arguments aired in the debate). These variables 
have a different impact on participants’ attitudes depending on the context 
(deliberative or not).  
The heuristics model suggests that awareness is the single most important 
variable in explaining attitude change and its effect will be different in an electoral as 
compared to a deliberative environment. For the heuristics model, the intensity of 
the messages in the election environment will make the more aware non-
participants more likely to become concerned about immigration, climate change 
and the European Union as time passes. However, the deliberative poll will weaken 
the impact of awareness over-time, because the information environment becomes 
so rich that the knowledge gap is quickly filled and the deliberative environment 
renders the source of the message less salient. For this reason, the heuristics model 
contends that deliberation will make it harder for people to understand who is 
saying what and in which direction the messages go. The model predicts that 
deliberation will make people more ambivalent, if not confused, about the 
implications of the messages they get. As a result, the typical curvilinear relationship 
between political awareness and attitude change – measured through awareness 
and awareness squared – will either be weakened or flattened for participants in the 
deliberative poll.  
The systematic model points to predispositions as the key variable in determining 
attitude change. According to the systematic model deliberation makes people more 
aware of where they stand ideologically on a given issue. In this connection, we 
should expect deliberation to be more effective than elections in making people 
more aware of the connections between their ideological preferences and the policy 
alternatives. In particular, the least politically aware and knowledgeable will change 
their attitudes because they will, for the first time, explicitly connect their 
predispositions to policy preferences (through a process that we could call 
’revelation’ (Isernia and Smets, forthcoming)), and the most politically astute will 
change because they will have an opportunity to engage their predispositions 
actively with the new and balanced information they will have received during the 
event.  
The deliberative model predicts that what makes the largest difference are not so 
much predispositions and awareness, but rather the knowledge gained during the 
deliberative poll as well as the diversity of arguments to which people are exposed. 
This model, therefore, predicts that participants in the deliberative poll will change 
attitudes as a consequence of the informational setting in which they are embedded 
and the nature of the arguments they are facing. What makes the deliberative 
setting conducive to such a change – as compared to elections – is the quality of the 
information and the possibility of exchanging substantive arguments about the merit 
of issues.  
 
<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE > 
 
To summarize, we expect that the three models predict that different variables – 
respectively awareness, predisposition, and knowledge – will play a key role in 
attitude change and that the effects will be different for participants and non-
participants, as illustrated in Table 1. Before presenting the results of our analyses, in 
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 For sake of clarity we focus our discussion on the main effects. We neglect the time dimension 
from a theoretical perspective, but because of the nature of our (panel) data we do use it to assess 
the impact of the different predictors with more precision.  
Data and methods  
 
The EuroPolis research design has many characteristics that are useful in the 
assessment our research question. First, it measures the attitudes of participants in 
the deliberative poll across four waves of data collection: 1) before the event, 2) on 
arrival at the site of the deliberative meeting, 3) at the end of the event, and 4) in 
the weeks after the European Parliamentary election of 2009. Second, the 
availability of a control group which was not invited and did not partake in the 
deliberative event is particularly advantageous, as it allows us to determine with a 
certain level of confidence whether observed changes in attitudes are indeed the 
result of participation in the deliberative poll. More information on the research 
design of EuroPolis can be found in the introduction of this special issue (see Isernia 
and Fishkin 2014). Our analyses are largely based on questions asked during all four 
waves of the deliberative poll. The dependent variables tap the attitudes of 
respondents on the three main themes of the EuroPolis project. We use two 
dependent variables to measure attitudes toward immigrants: a measure of the 
perception of the cultural threat and one of the economic threat from immigration. 
Furthermore, we generated an index to measure attitudes towards European 
integration as well as an index to measure attitudes regarding climate change. This 
makes a total of four dependent variables.  
A first measure of attitudes toward immigrants taps the perception of how 
culturally close immigrants have to be in order to be admitted to the respondents’ 
countries. The question asked, on a 0 to 10 scale, how important each of the 
following three criteria is to be ‘in deciding what immigrants from non-EU countries 
should be admitted’ to the country: ‘being able to speak the national language’; 
‘commitment to the national way of life’ and the fact that the immigrant was 
‘coming from a similar culture’. A fourth item asked where the respondent would 
position herself, always on a scale from 0 to 10, where ‘0 means that Muslim 
immigrants have a lot to offer to [COUNTRY]’s cultural life, 10 means that Muslim 
immigrants threaten the [NATIONALITY] culture and 5 is exactly in the middle’ (see 
online appendix A for the exact wording as well as summary statistics of all questions 
used for the analyses in this paper).  
The second index is based on three questions related to economic issues relevant 
for immigration. The questions all had the same format, scaled from 0 to 10. The first 
two asked how important ‘each of the following criteria should be in deciding what 
immigrants from non-EU countries should be admitted’: ‘having job skills that 
employers need’ and ‘being able to support oneself financially’. The third item asked 
the respondent’s position on a scale, where ‘0 means that immigrants take jobs from 
native-born [NATIONALITY], 10 means that immigrants take the sorts of jobs that 
[NATIONALITY] don’t want and 5 is exactly in the middle’.  
Our measure of attitudes towards European integration is based on two 
questions tapping the extent to which the respondents felt that EU membership had 
or had not had a positive impact on their country of origin. The first item asked 
whether respondents generally ‘think that [COUNTRY]’s membership of the 
European Union is a very good thing, a fairly good thing, neither good nor bad, a 
fairly bad thing, or a very bad thing’. The second item questioned the respondent on 
a scale where ‘0 means that [COUNTRY] has not benefitted at all from being a 
member of the EU, 10 means it has benefited enormously, and 5 is exactly in the 
middle’ whether in her or his view ‘[COUNTRY] has benefited or not benefited from 
being a member of the EU’.  
The fourth and last dependent variable taps the extent to which respondents feel 
that the fight against climate change affects the economy negatively. More precisely, 
respondents were asked to indicate where they position themselves on a scale from 
0 to 10 ‘where 0 means that we should do everything possible to combat climate 
change, even if that hurts the economy, 10 means that we should do everything 
possible to maximize economic growth, even if that hurts efforts to combat climate 
change and 5 is exactly in the middle’.  
As indicated above, in our study of attitude change we focus on three key 
independent variables: awareness, predispositions and knowledge. Awareness is 
measured through educational level. More precisely, respondents were asked at 
what age they completed full-time education. The educational level of respondents 
naturally does not change during the span of the project (circa 6 months). 
Predispositions used to ascertain issues in one way or another are measured through 
different indices for each of the three topics dealt with in this paper. Following Zaller 
(1992: 27), we use domain-specific measures of political values when possible and, 
lacking better measures, ideology as a proxy.  
The first index of predispositions measures general prejudice against immigrants 
and is based on the answers to two sets of questions, both aiming at measuring 
general orientations toward immigrants. A first set of three questions measures the 
extent to which the respondent is ready to grant illegal immigrants access to some 
basic services (national health care and public schooling) and to admit them 
irrespective of the country of origin. A second set of three questions measures the 
readiness of respondents to assign responsibility for some social problems to 
immigrants (for a similar measurement see Sniderman et al., 2000, 32-34). 
Specifically, this set of questions asked whether immigrants’ contributions ‘help to 
maintain the pension system’, whether immigration ‘increases crime in our society’, 
and whether ‘amnesty given to illegal immigrants will increase illegal immigration’.  
Our measure of predispositions towards European integration is tapped through 
two questions about the extent to which respondents think of themselves as ‘being 
European’ or alternatively think of themselves as ‘as just being from your 
[COUNTRY]’. Both questions are measured on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 indicated 
‘not at all’, 10 ‘completely’, and 5 is ‘exactly in the middle’. Lacking a more specific 
measure for climate change, we use the left-right self-placement scale as our 
measure of predispositions on this issue. Scores go from 0 ‘left’ to 10 ‘right’.  
To gauge the influence of the deliberative model we include an index of political 
knowledge tapping the number of correct answers to six – admittedly sometimes 
very specific – questions. The index ranges from 0 ‘all answers wrong’ to 6 ‘all 
answers correct’. Following Luskin et al. (2002) we consider ‘don’t know’ an incorrect 
answer. While the effect of knowledge is likely to become stronger for those 
participating in the deliberative poll, we do not expect to see the same effect in the 
control group. For the test group we also include a measure ranging from 0 and 10, 
where the highest score indicates that participants felt that opposing arguments 
were considered during the event and that they had learned a lot. Deliberation is 
measured at t3.  
Taking Dobrzynska and Blais (2008) as a point of departure we estimate our 
(adapted) RAS model of attitudes and attitude change through OLS regression 
analyses, estimating separate models for the reception and acceptance stage.4 
According to the reception model (see equation 1) attitudes at time ti are a function 
of awareness, which is time-invariant, and predisposition at ti.  
 
attitudeti = α + awareness * b1 + predispositionti   b2 + e                                        (1)  
 
The acceptance model, on the other hand, models attitudes at time ti as a 
function of awareness, awareness squared, predisposition at ti and the interaction 
between awareness and predisposition (see equation 2). To measure the impact of 
deliberation we include knowledge at ti as well as a measure of the balanced nature 
of the deliberative poll measured at t3 (included in the models for the participants 
only).  
 
attitudeti = α + awareness   b1 + awareness
2 * b2 + predispositionti   b3 + 
(awareness   predispositionti) * b4 + knowledgeti   b5 + deliberationt3 * b6 + e       (2)  
 
Our models will be estimated in a slightly different fashion than depicted in 
equations 1 and 2. Our data include a group of participants and a group of non-
participants. The participants were interviewed at four points in time, whereas the 
non-participants were interviewed only in wave 1 and wave 4. In a first step we are 
interested in the differences between participants and non-participants. More 
precisely, we want to assess whether there are differences between the test and the 
control group in the over-time changes in attitudes as well as in the over-time 
impact of key explanatory factors on the dependent variable. Reshaping the data 
into a long format allows us to track changes over time. In combination with a 
difference-in-difference-in-difference approach this allows us to estimate precisely 
those quantities that we are interested in. Just like Fraile (2014) in this special issue, 
                                                        
4 Note that we have made several changes to the Dobrzynska and Blais model based on our own 
reading of Zaller and Sniderman’s work. Notable differences are the inclusion of a squared term for 
awareness (see the hypothesis section for more details) and the fact that we use a single dependent 
variable for the reception and acceptance stage. This is in line with Zaller’s own operationalization of 
the RAS model (see, e.g., Zaller, 1992: 191).  
we create two dichotomous variables to track over-time differences between 
participants and non-participants. The variable ‘time’ takes a 0 at t1 and a 1 at t4. The 
variable ‘test’ identifies those respondents that are part of the treatment group (i.e. 
those that participated in the deliberative poll) and takes a 0 for the non-
participants. Equation 3 shows the structure of a basic difference-in-difference-in-
difference model, which is estimated through OLS regression analysis.  
 
attitudeti = α + timeit * b1 + testit   b2 + (timeit * testit) * b3 + xit * b4 + 
(xit * testit) * b5 + (xit * timeit) * b6 + (timeit  testit  xit) * b7 + e                                 (3)  
 
where α is the mean outcome for the control group at t1; α + b1 is the mean 
outcome for the control group at t4; b2 is the difference between the test and the 
control group at t1; α +b2 is the mean outcome for the participants at t1; α + b1 + b2 + 
b3 is the mean outcome for participants at t4; b4 is the impact of a key variable (xit) 
on the outcome of interest; b5 tracks the differences in the influence of xit between 
the participants and the non-participants; b6 tracks the differences in the influence 
of xit on the outcome variable over time. The difference-in-difference estimator is 
denoted by b3 and the difference-in-difference-in-difference by b7. These are the 
two quantities of main interest when it comes to explaining over-time differences 
between the participants and non-participants.5  
In this study the three key variables of interest (xit) are awareness, predisposition 
and knowledge. Due to the fact that each variable interacts with the variables ‘time’, 
‘test’, and ‘time * test’, we run the risk of multicollinearity. We have, therefore, 
opted to estimate two reception models (one with the interactions for awareness, 
and one with the interactions for predisposition) and three acceptance models (one 
                                                        
5 There are two main limitations of difference-in-difference (DID) models: 1) estimation is only 
appropriate when the intervention takes place (as good as) randomly; 2) because DID estimators are 
commonly derived from OLS regression analysis using repeated cross-sections or panel data serial 
correlation is a risk (see Bertrand et al. 2004 and Imbens and Wooldridge 2008). Turning to the first 
limitation, admittedly, the randomization characteristic of a true experimental design is not met in 
our research design. To assess whether these pre-treatment differences between participants and 
non-participants affect the outcomes of our analyses, we estimated our models applying propensity 
score matching (see online appendix C for more details). The longer the time-series, the higher the 
risk of serial correlation (Bertrand et al., 2004, 251). In our difference-in-difference models we rely on 
just two time points which should mitigate the risk of autocorrelation. We have, moreover, clustered 
the standard errors by respondents under the assumption that the over-time standard errors within a 
respondent are related to one another.  
with the interactions for awareness, one with the interactions for predisposition, and 
one with the interactions for knowledge). The remaining covariates are included in 
single terms.  
While we have a participant and a non-participant group – allowing us to 
estimate whether deliberation affects participants significantly – the principal aim of 
this study is to study the micro-mechanisms of attitude change during deliberation. 
The comparison between the participants and non-participants is based on data 
from t1 and t4 only, but for the participants we have four waves of data at our 
disposal. In a second step, we therefore estimate our models of attitude change 





In discussing the results we proceed in two steps. First, we compare participants and 
non-participants to explore whether they differ in the mechanisms through which 
they form their opinions depending on the context in which they operate. Second, 
we zoom in on those who actually participated in the deliberative poll to examine in 
greater detail what micro-mechanisms best explain their attitude formation 
process.6  
Three main results stand out from our analyses of participants and non-
participants. First, predispositions are by far the most relevant predictor of attitude 
change across all three issues. Second, predispositions play a different role for 
participants and non-participants. Third, the role of predispositions in deliberation 
varies depending on the issue. For some issues, deliberation strengthens previously 
held beliefs, while for other issues it makes people more nuanced and thoughtful. In 
                                                        
6
 As mentioned in the data and methods section, we estimate various models for the reception 
and acceptance stages to avoid multicollinearity problems. More precisely, we estimate two models 
for the reception stage. The first includes interactions between time, test group and awareness, the 
second includes interactions between time, test group and predisposition. The acceptance stage is 
modelled in three stages. The first model includes interactions between time, test group and 
awareness, the second model interactions between time, test group and predisposition and the third 
model interactions between time, test group and knowledge.  
this section we discuss these three results in detail, while we raise some of the 
implications arising from them in the conclusion of this paper.  
 
<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE > 
 
For the sake of clarity and simplicity, Table 2 summarizes the results for the main 
independent variables from the models in which we compare participants and non-
participants. The full models from which the entries in Table 2 are taken are 
reported in online appendix B (Tables 5 to 8).7   
The first result to emerge from our analyses is that of the three theoretical 
models examined, the systematic one clearly turns out to be the most effective in 
explaining attitude change in the four dependent variables. Our analyses show that – 
in line with the systematic model – predispositions play a much larger role in the 
process of opinion formation than the heuristics and deliberative models are ready 
to concede. This is true for both participants and non-participants.8 Awareness is not 
as important in the reception and acceptance stage as the heuristics model would 
predict. This does not mean that awareness never plays a role: we find it to be 
always relevant at the reception stage and sometimes at the acceptance stage, e.g. 
in relation to immigration as an economic threat. Knowledge, contrary to the 
expectations of the deliberative model, only has a negligible impact on attitude 
change.  
Thus, we do not find much evidence that the micro-mechanisms of attitude 
change are different for participants and non-participants. The role of 
predispositions at both the reception and acceptance stage and for both participants 
and non-participants clearly points to the greater capacity of the systematic model 
                                                        
7
 The full models from which the entries in Table 2 are taken are reported in online appendix B 
(Tables 5 to 8).  
8
 The difference-in-difference-in-difference models that compare the participants and the non-
participants allow us to answer several questions: 1) whether participants and non-participants 
behave differently in cognitive terms; 2) whether we find evidence of differences in over-time change 
in the dependent variables between participants and non-participants; 3) whether the impact of 
covariates changes between the two waves; 4) whether the over-time impact of covariates is 
different for participants and non-participants. For the sake of clarity and simplicity we focus our 
discussion on those aspects of the analyses that are related to the mechanisms of the three 
theoretical models.  
to account for the process of opinion formation in both conditions: deliberative and 
electoral. Instead of simply reacting to the informational environment, as suggested 
by the heuristics and deliberative models, both participants and non-participants 
engage with their environment. They do so in different ways in the two contexts, 
however, and this is our second conclusion.  
Although participants and non-participants in a deliberative poll do not behave 
differently in cognitive terms, deliberation does make an important difference on 
the way in which predispositions shape attitude change. Once people are engaged in 
a deliberative setting they become much more effective in using their 
predispositions to form opinions on the issues discussed. In the models for 
immigration as a cultural or as an economic threat, deliberation strengthens the grip 
of predispositions on attitudes. Deliberation, again as the systematic model would 
predict, heightens the capacity of people to calibrate new information and prior 
beliefs in ways that an election apparently does not. This appears not to be the case 
for the EU and climate change. The heightened ideological awareness fostered by 
the deliberative process thus seems to have different consequences based on the 
nature of the issue. This is the third and final result from our analyses and we will 
return to this point in more detail below.  
Since the most important aim of our paper is to advance our knowledge of the 
micro-mechanisms of attitude change in a deliberative setting, we also estimated 
our models of attitude change exclusively for participants of the deliberative poll 
making use of all four waves of data collected within the framework of the project.9 
The results of these analyses are presented in Table 3 and confirm the crucial role of 
predispositions at both the reception and acceptance stage.10 The results indicate 
that awareness does not have a systematic impact on the reception and acceptance 
of messages. Similarly, for the acceptance models, we see that knowledge and 
                                                        
9
 With the exception of the climate change model, which is still based on the first and the last 
wave as predisposition (measured through left-right self-placement) is available only for these two 
points in time.  
10
 The models are similar to those estimated for the test and control group simultaneously, but 
obviously do not include the dichotomous variable identifying participants of the poll. Also, the 
acceptance models now include a measure of the extent to which participants of the deliberative poll 
thought that they had learned much from their experience and thought that opposing arguments 
were considered in the discussions.  
deliberation have only a negligible impact on attitude formation and attitude 
change. Predispositions do, however, clearly influence perceptions of immigration as 
a cultural threat, immigration as an economic threat, the EU being beneficial to the 
country and the fight against climate change as an economic threat.  
 
<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE > 
 
The results in Table 3 once more suggest that the role played by predispositions 
in deliberation varies with the issue to be discussed. We can discern two different 
consequences of deliberation. When the issue discussed is the role of the EU or 
climate change, a genuine change of mind seems to be taking place. In both models 
the interaction term between predispositions and time is statistically significant in 
the acceptance models and its sign is opposite to the main coefficient. This suggests 
to us that the beliefs of participants change and change to more complex and 
nuanced ideas than before deliberation. In the case of the EU being beneficial to the 
country, participants become more tempered in their (positive) beliefs about the EU, 
while in the case of climate change they acquire a clearer idea of where they stand 
on the issue. A different pattern is observed in relation to attitudes on immigration. 
Here deliberation consolidates previous predispositions, making people form 
attitudes that match their policy preferences more closely than before deliberation. 




Conclusion and discussion  
 
In this paper we have attempted to move one step further in the direction of 
exploring the micro-foundations of attitude change in deliberation, an issue so far 
neglected by the burgeoning literature on empirical deliberative theory. We have 
presented and assessed three alternative models of attitude change, based on 
different degrees of ‘deliberation’. The first model, of which Zaller’s work is the 
clearest and most famous example, argues that what moves public opinion is the 
tenor of the media discourse, with citizens moving in different directions depending 
on the nature of the messages and the respondent’s level of political awareness. This 
heuristics model has been challenged by those (like Sniderman) who argue that 
political thinking has a systematic component – mainly represented by political 
ideology – that shapes both which messages we receive and how we react to them. 
This model, in contrast to the heuristics one, argues in favor of a central route to 
political reasoning but is still not fully deliberative. Although an empirical 
deliberative theory of attitude change does not yet exist (for some developments 
along this direction see Mercier and Landemore 2012; Mercier and Sperber 2011), 
we have introduced two elements that are considered crucial to any cognitive model 
of deliberation: information and argumentation (see e.g. Lindeman, 2002).  
We have assessed the relative strength of these three models using the quasi-
experimental data of the EuroPolis project comparing a group of people who 
participated in the deliberative poll with a control group which was not invited to the 
event. We used difference-in-difference-in-difference models across two waves of 
data collection to model possible differences between participants and non-
participants. In a second step, we estimated a fixed-effects model across four waves 
to assess the relative strength of the heuristics, systematic and deliberative models 
for participants of the deliberative poll. Adopting Zaller’s two-step model with its 
reception and acceptance stage as our point of departure, we built on this model 
adding those elements deemed crucial by the systematic and deliberative models.  
The main conclusions of our analyses are that, first, the results point quite clearly 
to the importance of predispositions in attitude formation. At the reception stage, 
our analyses offer a simple and straightforward picture: predispositions are an 
important predictor of message reception. Contrary to what Zaller argues and in 
support of the systematic and deliberative views of attitude change, there is a role 
for predispositions at the reception stage of attitude formation and attitude change. 
Awareness, which is at the core of the heuristics model, is in fact much less 
significant than predispositions are. As to the acceptance stage, for which our 
theoretical expectations were more varied, we notice that deliberation and 
information – two key elements of a deliberative process – are far less important in 
shaping attitude change than predispositions are. While the self-perceived variety of 
arguments is never significant, knowledge only has a weakly significant role to play in 
some circumstances. Awareness also plays a less important role than the heuristics 
model would predict at this stage.  
Our second finding is that we do not find much evidence that participants and 
non- participants of the deliberative poll behave very differently in cognitive terms. 
Attitude change in both groups seems to be driven by the same mechanisms. Should 
we interpret the finding that participants and non-participants behave in very similar 
ways when it comes to opinion formation as a thumbs down for deliberation? We 
suggest we should not. Since we are comparing a deliberative environment (set up 
through a quasi-experimental mechanism, i.e. the deliberative poll) with a natural 
one (an election time), the similarities between participants and non-participants 
suggest not so much the shortcomings of deliberation but rather the potential of 
European elections to make people reflect upon public issues. In other words, the 
results seem to suggest that elections have a potential to approximate some of the 
balanced and rich information conditions characteristic of a deliberative event. Of 
the three issues examined in this paper – immigration, climate change, and EU 
integration – the one showing the least differences between the test and the control 
group is EU integration. We surmise that this similarity of effects is due to the very 
peculiar nature of the issue during the European elections. After all, what else 
should be made salient in such an electoral context if not the European dimension? 
In conclusion, the results suggest that for the control group the EU parliamentary 
elections might play the role of deliberation in disguise. This result, as initial and 
tentative as it is, has a reassuring implication for politics. Elections can, under certain 
conditions, have the potential to achieve effects similar to those of deliberation in a 
quasi-experimental setting.  
Still, substantial differences do exist between public deliberation in a poll and at 
election time. Predispositions shape attitude formation in a deliberative 
environment in different ways depending on the issue at hand. This is our last result. 
On the one hand, when issues are more technical (e.g., climate change and the EU) a 
deliberative environment makes people more thoughtful about complexities and 
sensitive to dissonant information. On the other hand, when issues pertain to 
immigration deliberation strengthens pre-existing beliefs. This leaves open the more 
fundamental question of whether deliberation can make people more thoughtful 
only in some conditions: those conditions in which technical and not highly 
politicized issues are debated, or whether, as some proponents suggest, it can also 
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Systematic model Deliberative 
model 
Awareness Only non-participants 
change attitudes 
  
Predispositions  Both participants and  
non-participants change 
 
Knowledge   Only participants 
change attitudes 
 
Table 1: The expected impact of three key variables on attitude change according to 





 immigration immigration EU beneficial climate change 
 cultural threat economic threat to country economic threat 


















awareness -0.034** -0.111* -0.036** -0.167*** 0.015** 0.017 -0.043* -0.141 
 (0.016) (0.058) (0.015) (0.044) (0.007) (0.019) (0.025) (0.087) 
awareness*test 0.005 0.006 -0.020 -0.018 -0.003 -0.004 0.015 0.014 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.010) (0.010) (0.040) (0.040) 
predisposition 0.765*** 0.677** 0.586*** 0.120 0.168*** 0.193*** 0.137** 0.023 
 (0.110) (0.290) (0.109) (0.258) (0.016) (0.055) (0.055) (0.140) 
predisposition*test 0.488*** 0.489*** 0.485*** 0.459*** 0.010 0.012 0.154* 0.146* 
 (0.172) (0.174) (0.173) (0.174) (0.028) (0.029) (0.085) (0.085) 
knowledge  -0.082  -0.078  0.069*  0.133 
  (0.088)  (0.086)  (0.036)  (0.135) 
knowledge*test  0.071  0.265*  -0.078  0.203 
   (0.169)  (0.151)  (0.067)  (0.225) 
Note: b coefficients from OLS regression analyses with standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses; data entries summarize 
results from various models presented in online appendix B; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 2: A summary of the impact of awareness, predispositions and knowledge on attitude change 
  
 
immigration immigration EU beneficial climate change 
cultural threat economic threat to country economic threat 




time -0.201 -0.158 0.117** -0.044 
 (0.200) (0.197) (0.055) (0.307) 
awareness -0.015 -0.039* 0.015* -0.018 
 (0.027) (0.023) (0.009) (0.038) 
awareness*time 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.007 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.012) 
predisposition 1.205*** 1.038*** 0.166*** 0.293*** 
 (0.154) (0.154) (0.026) (0.087) 
predisposition*time 0.060 0.053 -0.013* -0.000 
 (0.046) (0.052) (0.008) (0.027) 
constant 2.633*** 3.920*** 2.729*** 3.226*** 
 (0.709) (0.649) (0.199) (0.950) 
N 1130 1148 1240 603 
t 4 4 4 2 
R2 0.246 0.231 0.188 0.092 




time -0.067 -0.113 0.100* -0.091 
 (0.231) (0.215) (0.060) (0.327) 
awareness -0.172 -0.149 -0.049 -0.180 
 (0.107) (0.093) (0.030) (0.117) 
awareness*time 0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.013) 
awareness2 0.004* 0.002 0.001*** 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
predisposition 1.239** 0.906** 0.156*** -0.007** 
 (0.575) (0.420) (0.058) (0.003) 
predisposition*time 0.046 0.058 -0.017** 0.249*** 
 (0.048) (0.056) (0.008) (0.091) 
awareness*predisposition -0.002 0.004 0.001 0.007 
 (0.027) (0.019) (0.003) (0.028) 
knowledge 0.005 0.148 -0.059 0.459* 
 (0.132) (0.124) (0.056) (0.239) 
knowledge*time -0.054 -0.062 0.036* -0.118* 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.018) (0.068) 
deliberation 0.065 0.050 0.001 -0.030 
 (0.050) (0.038) (0.016) (0.058) 
constant 3.567* 4.670*** 3.418*** 5.276*** 
 (1.836) (1.543) (0.464) (1.501) 
N 1089 1106 1187 579 
t 4 4 4 2 
R2 0.250 0.224 0.217 0.119 
SEE 1.86 1.71 .69 2.64 
Note: b coefficients from OLS regression analysis with standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses; 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; dependent variables: cultural threat index, economic threat index (0 = no 
threat , 10 = great threat), positive impact of EU on country index (1 = negative feeling, 5 = positive feeling), the 
fight against climate change as an economic threat index (1 = no economic threat, 10 = economic threat); 
independent variables: ‘awareness’ age finished full-time education (range: 0-35 years); ‘predisposition’ 
hostility index (1 = sympathetic towards immigrants, 5 = hostile towards immigrants), feeling European index (0 
= negative feeling, 10 = positive feeling), left-right self-placement (0 = left, 10 = right); knowledge (range: 
0-6 = all answers correct); deliberation (0-10 = learned a lot and opposing arguments were considered). 
 
Table 3: Adapted RAS models of attitude change in a deliberative setting – test 
group
 Smets & Isernia (EUP 2014)                                            ’The Role of Deliberation in Attitude Change’ 
 
 





1. Immigration as a cultural threat index 
 
Q10 – On a 0-10 scale, where ‘0’ is ‘extremely unimportant’, ‘10’ is ‘extremely important’, and ‘5’ is 
‘exactly in the middle’, how important or not would you say each of the following criteria should 
be in deciding what immigrants from non-EU countries should be admitted to [COUNTRY]? 
 
Q10.3 – Being able to speak [NATIONAL LANGUAGE].  
Q10.7 – Commitment to the [NATIONALITY] way of life.  
Q10.8 – Coming from a similar culture. 
 
Q15 – On a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means that Muslim immigrants have a lot to offer to 
[COUN- TRY]’s cultural life, 10 means that Muslim immigrants threaten [NATIONALITY] culture, and 
5 is exactly in the middle, where would you position yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought 
much about that? 
 
 
2. Immigration as an economic threat index 
 
Q10 – On a 0-10 scale, where ‘0’ is ‘extremely unimportant’, ‘10’ is ‘extremely important’, and ‘5’ is 
‘exactly in the middle’, how important or not would you say each of the following criteria should 
be in deciding what immigrants from non-EU countries should be admitted to [COUNTRY]? 
 
Q10.1 – Having job skills that employers need.  
Q10.6 – Being able to support oneself financially. 
 
Q16 – On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means that immigrants take jobs from native-born 
[NATION- ALITY], 10 means that immigrants take the sorts of jobs that [NATIONALITY] don’t want 
and 5 is exactly in the middle, where would you position yourself on this scale, or haven’t you 
thought much about that? 
 
 
3. EU beneficial to country index 
 
Q35 – Generally speaking, do you think that [COUNTRY]’s membership of the European Union is a 
very good thing, a fairly good thing, neither good nor bad, a fairly bad thing, or a very bad thing? 
 
Q36 – On a 0 to 10 scale, where 0 means that [COUNTRY] has not benefitted at all from being a 
member of the EU, 10 means it has benefited enormously, and 5 is exactly in the middle, using this 
scale, would you say that on balance [COUNTRY] has benefited or not benefited from being a 
member of the EU? 
  
 
4. The fight against climate change as an economic threat index 
 
Q21 – On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means that we should do everything possible to combat 
climate change, even if that hurts the economy, 10 means that we should do everything possible 
to maximize economic growth, even if that hurts efforts to combat climate change and 5 is exactly 




Independent variables: awareness 
 
EDUC - At what age did you complete your full-time education? 
 
 
Independent variables: predisposition 
 
1. Hostility against immigrants index 
 
Q9 – How strongly would you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? 
 
Q9.1 – Illegal immigrants should be eligible for national health care. 
Q9.2 – The children of illegal immigrants should be eligible to attend public school. 
Q9.3 – Decisions about what immigrants to admit should take no account of what country they 
are from. 
 
Q13 – How strongly would you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? 
 
Q13.1 – The contributions from working immigrants will help maintain the pension system.  
Q13.2 – Immigration increases crime in our society. 
Q13.3 – Amnesty given to illegal immigrants will increase illegal immigration. 
 
 
2. Feeling European index 
 
Q33a – On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is ‘not at all’, 10 is ‘completely’, and 5 is ‘exactly in the 
middle’, how much would you say you think of yourself as being European? 
 
Q33b – And on the same 0 to 10 scale, how much would you say you think of yourself as just being 
from your [COUNTRY]? 
 
 
3. Left-right self-placement 
 
LEFTRIGHT – In political matters people talk of the left and the right.  What is your position? 
Please indicate your views using any number on a scale where 0 means left and 10 means right. 
Which number best describes your position? 
  
 
Independent variables: knowledge 
 
Correct answers are denoted with an * 
 
Q43 – Is the main decision-making body of the European Union the...? 
1.)  European Commission, 2.)  Council of Ministers*, 3.)  European Parliament, or 4.)  European 
Court of Auditors 
 
Q44 – Only one of the following statements about the European Parliament is false. Which one is 
it? 
1.) It passes all EU laws*, 2.) It can dismiss the European Commission, 3.) It can reject the budget 
proposed by the Council of Ministers, 4.)  It is involved in decisions about the admission of new 
Member States. 
 Q46 – Which of the following is true of Blue card workers? 
1.) They can work anywhere in the EU, 2.) They must have a university education*, 3.) They cannot 
bring family members to join them any faster than other immigrants, 4.)  They are subject to the 
Returns Directive. 
 
Q47 – Which of the following is true about the ways in which immigration policy is currently 
made? 
1.)  The EU sets the basic rules about entry and residency 1 requirements*, 2.)  The EU decides 
how many immigrants can be admitted to 2 each country, 3.) Work permits for immigrants must 
be approved by the EU, 4.) The EU plays no role in immigration policy. 
 
Q49 – The percentage of the EU’s total energy consumption that comes from fossil fuels (coal, gas 
or oil) is about...? 
1.) 0,5, 2.) 0,6, 3.) 0,7, 4.) 0,8* 
 
Q50 – Which of the following produces the most greenhouse gases? 
1.) China*, 2.) The European Union, 3.) The United States, 4.) India. 
 
 
Independent variables: deliberation 
 
On a 0 to 10 scale, where 0 means ‘completely disagree’, 10 means ‘completely agree’, and 5 is 
‘exactly in the middle’, how strongly would you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements is? 
 
Q66.3 – My small group moderator tried to make sure that opposing arguments were considered 
 
Q66.4 – I learned a lot about people different from me – about who they are and how they live. 
   test group control group 
 variable  n mean sd min max n mean sd min max 
wave 1 cultural threat index 320 5.52 2.19 0 10 671 5.90 2.01 0 10 
 economic threat index 318 5.77 2.11 0 10 689 6.01 1.86 0 10 
 EU good thing index 328 3.87 0.87 1 5 707 3.60 0.92 1 5 
 climate change economic threat index  323 4.15 2.96 0 10 707 4.44 2.97 0 10 
 education 321 19.70 4.90 0 35 712 18.99 4.59 0 35 
 hostility index 302 2.60 0.82 1 5 656 2.77 0.75 1 5 
 feeling European index 332 4.67 2.11 0 10 720 4.27 2.04 0 10 
 left-right self-placement 315 5.10 2.66 0 10 682 5.22 2.50 0 10 
 knowledge 333 1.18 0.93 0 6 729 1.05 0.91 0 5 
 deliberation 317 7.73 2.15 0 10 . . . . . 
wave 2 cultural threat index 305 5.32 2.27 0 10      
 economic threat index 317 5.87 1.88 0 10      
 EU good thing index 319 4.05 0.74 1 5      
 climate change economic threat index  324 3.76 2.94 0 10      
 education 321 19.70 4.90 0 35      
 hostility index 293 2.62 0.80 1 4,83      
 feeling European index 324 5.20 2.27 0 10      
 left-right self-placement . . . . .      
 knowledge 333 1.66 1.25 0 5      
 deliberation 317 7.73 2.15 0 10      
wave 3 cultural threat index 315 5.17 2.18 0 10      
 economic threat index 317 5.72 1.96 0 10      
 EU good thing index 322 4.14 0.72 1 5      
 climate change economic threat index  328 3.37 2.88 0 10      
 education 321 19.70 4.90 0 35      
 hostility index 301 2.46 0.72 1 4,33      
 feeling European index 322 5.35 2.16 0 10      
 left-right self-placement . . . . .      
 knowledge 333 2.19 1.30 0 6      
 deliberation 317 7.73 2.15 0 10      
wave 4 cultural threat index 321 5.25 2.03 0 10 657 5.82 2.08 0 10 
 economic threat index 329 5.62 1.85 0 10 680 6.05 1.66 0 10 
 EU good thing index 330 4.15 0.73 1 5 705 3.66 0.88 1 5 
 climate change economic threat index  331 3.68 2.70 0 10 703 4.20 2.65 0 10 
 education 321 19.70 4.90 0 35 712 18.99 4.59 0 35 
 hostility index 318 2.51 0.80 1 5 634 2.73 0.79 1 5 
 feeling European index 333 5.25 1.97 0 10 719 4.34 1.89 0 10 
 left-right self-placement 321 5.22 2.61 0 10 681 5.24 2.51 0 10 
 knowledge 333 2.12 1.25 0 5 729 1.03 0.93 0 4 
 deliberation 317 7.73 2.15 0 10 . . . . . 
 
 
Table 4: Summary statistics














time 0.110 -0.949** 0.097 -0.943** -0.131 
 (0.345) (0.371) (0.342) (0.372) (0.148) 
test group -0.303 -1.522*** -0.307 -1.518*** -0.280 
 (0.554) (0.484) (0.550) (0.488) (0.235) 
time*test group -0.337 0.468 -0.320 0.607 0.530* 
 (0.569) (0.525) (0.569) (0.536) (0.277) 
awareness -0.034** -0.034*** -0.111* -0.101* -0.109** 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.058) (0.055) (0.055) 
predisposition 1.068*** 0.765*** 0.876*** 0.677** 0.890*** 
 (0.069) (0.110) (0.288) (0.290) (0.287) 
awareness*time -0.008  -0.007   
 (0.017)  (0.017)   
awareness*test 0.005  0.006   
 (0.028)  (0.027)   
awareness*time*test 0.011  0.015   
 (0.028)  (0.028)   
predisposition*time  0.327**  0.326**  
  (0.134)  (0.134)  
predisposition*test  0.488***  0.489***  
  (0.172)  (0.174)  
predisposition*time*test  -0.193  -0.215  
  (0.197)  (0.199)  
awareness2   0.001 0.001 0.001 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
awareness*predisposition   0.010 0.005 0.009 
   (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
knowledge   -0.099** -0.090* -0.082 
   (0.050) (0.050) (0.088) 
knowledge*time     0.082 
     (0.111) 
knowledge*test     0.071 
     (0.169) 
knowledge*time*test     -0.340* 
     (0.190) 
constant 3.604*** 4.446*** 4.685*** 5.263*** 4.617*** 
 (0.382) (0.386) (0.892) (0.855) (0.852) 
N 1768 1768 1768 1768 1768 
R2 0.188 0.195 0.191 0.198 0.193 
SEE 1.86 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 
Note: b coefficients from OLS regression analysis with standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses;  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; dependent variable: cultural threat index (0 = no threat , 10 = great threat); 
independent variables: ‘awareness’ age finished full-time education (range: 0-35 years); ‘predisposition’ hostility 
index (1 = sympathetic towards immigrants, 5 = hostile towards immigrants); knowledge (range: 0-6 = all answers 
correct). 
 
Table 5: Adapted RAS models of attitude change test and control group – immigration 
as a cultural threat 
  
 










time -0.224 -0.140 -0.291 -0.126 0.015 
 (0.330) (0.329) (0.331) (0.330) (0.135) 
test group 0.312 -1.392*** 0.269 -1.325*** -0.402* 
 (0.514) (0.502) (0.500) (0.504) (0.225) 
time*test group 0.105 -0.235 0.090 -0.198 0.353 
 (0.540) (0.546) (0.543) (0.553) (0.286) 
awareness -0.036** -0.039*** -0.167*** -0.151*** -0.162*** 
 (0.015) (0.010) (0.044) (0.042) (0.042) 
predisposition 0.794*** 0.586*** 0.239 0.120 0.234 
 (0.065) (0.109) (0.259) (0.258) (0.255) 
awareness*time 0.013  0.017   
 (0.017)  (0.017)   
awareness*test -0.020  -0.018   
 (0.026)  (0.025)   
awareness*time*test -0.011  -0.008   
 (0.026)  (0.027)   
predisposition*time  0.059  0.054  
  (0.116)  (0.116)  
predisposition*test  0.485***  0.459***  
  (0.173)  (0.174)  
predisposition*time*test  0.069  0.071  
  (0.200)  (0.201)  
awareness2   0.001 0.001 0.001 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
awareness*predisposition   0.029** 0.025* 0.028** 
   (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
knowledge   -0.039 -0.038 -0.078 
   (0.044) (0.044) (0.086) 
knowledge*time     0.015 
     (0.104) 
knowledge*test     0.265* 
     (0.151) 
knowledge*time*test     -0.304* 
     (0.179) 
constant 4.515*** 5.140*** 6.568*** 6.857*** 6.585*** 
 (0.340) (0.361) (0.739) (0.710) (0.699) 
N 1803 1803 1803 1803 1803 
R2 0.137 0.147 0.141 0.151 0.143 
SEE 1.70 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 
Note: b coefficients from OLS regression analysis with standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses;  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; dependent variable: economic threat index (0 = no threat , 10 = great threat); 
independent variables: ‘awareness’ age finished full-time education (range: 0-35 years); ‘predisposition’ hostility 


















time 0.108 0.076 0.114 0.076 0.041 
 (0.131) (0.096) (0.130) (0.096) (0.056) 
test group 0.265 0.164 0.279 0.150 0.299*** 
 (0.215) (0.148) (0.214) (0.151) (0.087) 
time*test group 0.065 0.373** 0.007 0.314** -0.063 
 (0.206) (0.159) (0.206) (0.157) (0.120) 
awareness 0.015** 0.014*** 0.017 0.015 0.015 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) 
predisposition 0.162*** 0.168*** 0.189*** 0.193*** 0.192*** 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) 
awareness*time -0.002  -0.003   
 (0.006)  (0.006)   
awareness*test -0.003  -0.004   
 (0.010)  (0.010)   
awareness*time*test 0.003  0.003   
 (0.010)  (0.010)   
predisposition*time  -0.003  -0.003  
  (0.020)  (0.020)  
predisposition*test  0.010  0.012  
  (0.028)  (0.029)  
predisposition*time*test  -0.047  -0.049  
  (0.031)  (0.031)  
awareness2   0.000 0.000 0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
awareness*predisposition   -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
knowledge   0.072*** 0.072*** 0.069* 
   (0.019) (0.019) (0.036) 
knowledge*time     0.020 
     (0.045) 
knowledge*test     -0.078 
     (0.067) 
knowledge*time*test     0.087 
     (0.079) 
constant 2.599*** 2.602*** 2.450*** 2.475*** 2.481*** 
 (0.140) (0.113) (0.280) (0.274) (0.272) 
N 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 
R2 0.195 0.196 0.202 0.203 0.203 
SEE .80 .80 .80 .79 .79 
Note: b coefficients from OLS regression analysis with standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses;  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; dependent variable: positive impact of EU on country index (1 = negative feeling, 
5 = positive feeling); independent variables: ‘awareness’ age finished full-time education (range: 0-35 years); 



















time -0.449 0.278 -0.461 0.272 -0.037 
 (0.561) (0.351) (0.563) (0.351) (0.215) 
test group -0.506 -0.996** -0.488 -0.961** -0.468 
 (0.815) (0.473) (0.816) (0.474) (0.328) 
time*test group 0.424 -0.837 0.534 -0.893 -0.012 
 (0.942) (0.547) (0.959) (0.552) (0.428) 
awareness -0.043* -0.037** -0.141 -0.108 -0.130 
 (0.025) (0.015) (0.087) (0.081) (0.084) 
predisposition 0.159*** 0.137** -0.006 0.023 -0.004 
 (0.031) (0.055) (0.139) (0.140) (0.139) 
awareness*time 0.011  0.012   
 (0.028)  (0.028)   
awareness*test 0.015  0.014   
 (0.040)  (0.040)   
awareness*time*test -0.037  -0.045   
 (0.046)  (0.047)   
predisposition*time  -0.097  -0.096  
  (0.063)  (0.063)  
predisposition*test  0.154*  0.146*  
  (0.085)  (0.085)  
predisposition*time*test  0.099  0.100  
  (0.103)  (0.102)  
awareness2   0.001 0.001 0.001 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
awareness*predisposition   0.008 0.006 0.008 
   (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
knowledge   0.064 0.057 0.133 
   (0.068) (0.068) (0.135) 
knowledge*time     -0.179 
     (0.169) 
knowledge*test     0.203 
     (0.225) 
knowledge*time*test     -0.192 
     (0.262) 
constant 4.430*** 4.431*** 5.703*** 5.339*** 5.505*** 
 (0.526) (0.413) (1.117) (1.026) (1.060) 
N 1900 1900 1900 1900 1900 
R2 0.034 0.043 0.036 0.044 0.038 
SEE 2.76 2.75 2.76 2.75 2.76 
Note: b coefficients from OLS regression analysis with standard errors clustered by respondent in 
parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; dependent variable: the fight against climate change as an 
economic threat index (1 = no economic threat, 10 = economic threat); independent variables: ‘awareness’ 
age finished full-time education (range: 0-35 years); ‘predisposition’ left-right self-placement (0 = left, 10 = 
right); knowledge (range: 0-6 = all answers correct). 
 
 
Table 8: Adapted RAS models of attitude change test and control group – the fight against 
climate change as an economic threat 
 
  
Online Appendix C: Models with propensity score matching 
 
In quasi-experimental research designs like the one for EuroPolis, one characteristic of a true 
experiment is missing. In our case, the respondents of the questionnaire administered in the 
first wave were randomly assigned to a test or a control group. Respondents assigned to the test 
group were subsequently invited to the deliberative poll. The latter step violates the 
randomization characteristic of true experimental designs as it is not a far stretch to assume that 
respondents with higher levels of political interest, better educated respondents, or those with 
more time on their hands were favorably inclined to participate in a three-day polling event. 
The pre-treatment differences between participants and non-participants make it 
impossible to conclude that observed differences in attitude changes for participants and non-
participants exist because some respondents participated in the deliberative poll and others did 
not (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The observed difference could, after all, also be the result of 
the two groups having slightly different characteristics to start with. In our models including 
both participants and non- participants (Tables 5 to 8) we have observed differences between the 
impact of certain covariates between the two groups. Propensity score matching helps us 
understand whether these differences are due to pre-existing differences between participants 
and non-participants. 
In essence, matching is a method that allows one to pre-process data by finding matching 
cases in terms of a number of confounding pre-treatment control covariates in the test group and 
the control group.  Unmatched cases are not used for analysis.  The ultimate aim of matching is 
to arrive at a better balance between the test group and the control group in as much that 
the distribution of covariates in the two groups is more in tune. Matching leads to results being 
less model dependent and reduces statistical bias (Deheija and Wahba, 1998,1999; Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1983; Rubin, 1987 ). By obtaining more balance more meaningful comparisons can be 
made between the test group and the control group. 
In this appendix we apply coarsened exact matching (cem). The first step of cem is to 
categorize respondents in substantially meaningful groups. In a next step, for each participant a 
matching non- participant is found that matches exactly on the (coarsened) covariates (Blackwell 
et al., 2009; Iacus et al., 2011a,b). Cases that do not have an exact match are not considered. 
The coarsened values are abandoned for the estimation of the models and original values of the 
matched data are used for the estimation of the causal effects. 
Coarsened exact matching begins with the calculation of the multivariate imbalance of the 
un- matched data. In a next step, a matching algorithm is applied to try to improve balance. 
Once the best matching algorithm is established, matching essentially becomes a weighting 
scheme.  Taking into account age, gender, education, religion and social class the multivariate 
imbalance in our data set equals .728 on a scale from 0 (no multivariate imbalance) to 1 
(complete separation).  After applying the cem algorithm based on age, gender and education 
the multivariate imbalance drops to .147 while retaining 99,2% of our cases to work with. While 
various combinations of pretreatment variables were tried, none of these resulted such a stark 
improvement of the balance and such a high number of remaining observations. 
Tables 9 to 12 show the results of the same models as estimated in Tables 5 to 8, this time 
with the cem weights applied. The differences between the two sets of models are very small. The 
impact of awareness seems to have weakened somewhat in most of the models, but this is 
expected as awareness is measured through educational levels and this is one of the variables on 
which the matching algorithm is based. Statistically significant differences between participants 
and non-participants in the unweighted models are still apparent in the models where propensity 
score matching was applied. This indicates that the observed differences are not caused by pre-
treatment differences between both groups.  In other words, we can now conclude with more 
confidence that the observed differences are indeed the result of participating in the 
deliberative poll.  The only exception are the models w i t h  perceptions of the fight against 
climate change as an economic threat, where the differences between participants and non-
participants disappear after applying cem weights.  The models for climate change were, 
however, already observed to perform more poorly than the others. 
  
 










time 0.221 -1.450*** 0.274 -1.402*** -0.148 
 (0.462) (0.539) (0.447) (0.543) (0.190) 
test group -0.503 -1.859*** -0.515 -1.872*** -0.254 
 (0.730) (0.626) (0.711) (0.628) (0.250) 
time*test group -0.262 0.978 -0.257 1.119* 0.578* 
 (0.648) (0.657) (0.644) (0.664) (0.296) 
awareness -0.052* -0.049*** 0.043 0.043 0.044 
 (0.027) (0.015) (0.115) (0.112) (0.116) 
predisposition 1.073*** 0.646*** 1.076*** 0.705** 1.089*** 
 (0.089) (0.197) (0.389) (0.346) (0.391) 
awareness*time -0.011  -0.013   
 (0.025)  (0.024)   
awareness*test 0.021  0.022   
 (0.037)  (0.036)   
awareness*time*test 0.002  0.006   
 (0.034)  (0.033)   
predisposition*time  0.529**  0.513**  
  (0.210)  (0.212)  
predisposition*test  0.652***  0.662***  
  (0.237)  (0.237)  
predisposition*time*test  -0.419  -0.441*  
  (0.256)  (0.257)  
awareness2   -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
awareness*predisposition   -0.000 -0.003 -0.001 
   (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) 
knowledge   -0.111** -0.103* -0.133 
   (0.053) (0.053) (0.112) 
knowledge*time     0.143 
     (0.130) 
knowledge*test     0.150 
     (0.181) 
knowledge*time*test     -0.457** 
     (0.198) 
constant 3.842*** 4.959*** 3.046** 4.100*** 3.021** 
 (0.645) (0.646) (1.523) (1.397) (1.488) 
N 1701 1701 1701 1701 1701 
R2 0.192 0.204 0.196 0.208 0.199 
SEE 1.85 1.84 1.85 1.84 1.85 
Note: b coefficients from OLS regression analysis with standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses;  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; dependent variable: cultural threat index (0 = no threat , 10 = great threat); 
independent variables: ‘awareness’ age finished full-time education (range: 0-35 years); ‘predisposition’ hostility 
index (1 = sympathetic towards immigrants, 5 = hostile towards immigrants); knowledge (range: 0-6 = all answers 
correct). 
 
Table 9: Adapted RAS models of attitude change test and control group with cem 
weights applied – immigration as a cultural threat 
  
 










time -0.081 -0.366 -0.153 -0.342 0.046 
 (0.438) (0.379) (0.436) (0.380) (0.147) 
test group 0.205 -1.394*** 0.126 -1.393*** -0.402* 
 (0.634) (0.531) (0.628) (0.531) (0.234) 
time*test group 0.019 -0.043 0.028 -0.005 0.312 
 (0.663) (0.582) (0.660) (0.591) (0.296) 
awareness -0.056*** -0.057*** -0.179*** -0.176*** -0.177*** 
 (0.021) (0.012) (0.058) (0.053) (0.053) 
predisposition 0.825*** 0.581*** 0.255 0.010 0.238 
 (0.072) (0.123) (0.316) (0.318) (0.312) 
awareness*time 0.008  0.012   
 (0.021)  (0.021)   
awareness*test -0.014  -0.010   
 (0.031)  (0.031)   
awareness*time*test -0.009  -0.008   
 (0.032)  (0.032)   
predisposition*time  0.155  0.147  
  (0.133)  (0.133)  
predisposition*test  0.489***  0.491***  
  (0.185)  (0.185)  
predisposition*time*test  -0.019  -0.021  
  (0.213)  (0.214)  
awareness2   0.001 0.001 0.001 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
awareness*predisposition   0.029* 0.029* 0.029* 
   (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
knowledge   -0.036 -0.035 -0.080 
   (0.048) (0.048) (0.102) 
knowledge*time     0.026 
     (0.121) 
knowledge*test     0.283* 
     (0.164) 
knowledge*time*test     -0.325* 
     (0.194) 
constant 4.771*** 5.483*** 6.792*** 7.417*** 6.852*** 
 (0.470) (0.428) (0.956) (0.874) (0.843) 
N 1736 1736 1736 1736 1736 
R2 0.152 0.162 0.156 0.166 0.159 
SEE 1.70 1.69 1.69 1.68 1.69 
Note: b coefficients from OLS regression analysis with standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses;  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; dependent variable: economic threat index (0 = no threat , 10 = great threat); 
independent variables: ‘awareness’ age finished full-time education (range: 0-35 years); ‘predisposition’ hostility 




Table 10: Adapted RAS models of attitude change test and control group with cem weights 
applied – immigration as an economic threat 
  
 










time 0.158 0.184 0.154 0.183 -0.016 
 (0.163) (0.123) (0.165) (0.121) (0.066) 
test group 0.073 0.181 0.076 0.173 0.232** 
 (0.266) (0.153) (0.269) (0.155) (0.093) 
time*test group 0.115 0.274 0.091 0.224 -0.025 
 (0.240) (0.175) (0.246) (0.175) (0.127) 
awareness 0.009 0.009 0.023 0.020 0.022 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) 
predisposition 0.165*** 0.181*** 0.163** 0.174** 0.163** 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.071) (0.072) (0.071) 
awareness*time -0.005  -0.005   
 (0.008)  (0.008)   
awareness*test 0.006  0.006   
 (0.013)  (0.013)   
awareness*time*test 0.000  -0.001   
 (0.012)  (0.012)   
predisposition*time  -0.028  -0.028  
  (0.025)  (0.025)  
predisposition*test  0.003  0.004  
  (0.029)  (0.030)  
predisposition*time*test  -0.027  -0.028  
  (0.035)  (0.034)  
awareness2   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
awareness*predisposition   0.000 0.000 0.000 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
knowledge   0.061*** 0.062*** 0.022 
   (0.020) (0.020) (0.040) 
knowledge*time     0.071 
     (0.053) 
knowledge*test     -0.030 
     (0.072) 
knowledge*time*test     0.039 
     (0.087) 
constant 2.717*** 2.647*** 2.538*** 2.514*** 2.597*** 
 (0.195) (0.139) (0.478) (0.457) (0.450) 
N 1927 1927 1927 1927 1927 
R2 0.193 0.195 0.198 0.200 0.200 
SEE .79 .79 .79 .79 .79 
Note: b coefficients from OLS regression analysis with standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses;  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; dependent variable: positive impact of EU on country index (1 = negative feeling, 
5 = positive feeling); independent variables: ‘awareness’ age finished full-time education (range: 0-35 years); 




Table 11: Adapted RAS models of attitude change test and control group with cem weights 
applied – EU beneficial to country 
  
 










time -0.976 0.050 -0.977 0.041 -0.287 
 (0.644) (0.388) (0.640) (0.390) (0.239) 
test group 0.086 -0.794 0.065 -0.767 -0.471 
 (0.897) (0.505) (0.873) (0.503) (0.335) 
time*test group 1.116 -0.598 1.023 -0.704 0.088 
 (1.041) (0.576) (1.034) (0.578) (0.445) 
awareness -0.012 -0.010 0.074 0.091 0.083 
 (0.029) (0.016) (0.079) (0.078) (0.079) 
predisposition 0.187*** 0.177*** 0.080 0.081 0.076 
 (0.034) (0.062) (0.161) (0.171) (0.163) 
awareness*time 0.034  0.034   
 (0.033)  (0.033)   
awareness*test -0.017  -0.016   
 (0.043)  (0.042)   
awareness*time*test -0.071  -0.071   
 (0.052)  (0.052)   
predisposition*time  -0.069  -0.068  
  (0.070)  (0.070)  
predisposition*test  0.107  0.101  
  (0.091)  (0.091)  
predisposition*time*test  0.058  0.063  
 
awareness2 






   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
awareness*predisposition   0.005 0.005 0.005 
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
knowledge   0.092 0.083 0.102 
   (0.076) (0.076) (0.138) 
knowledge*time     -0.020 
     (0.194) 
knowledge*test     0.183 
     (0.228) 
knowledge*time*test     -0.292 
     (0.283) 
constant 3.699*** 3.716*** 3.074*** 2.922*** 2.988*** 
 (0.607) (0.497) (1.115) (1.085) (1.067) 
N 1830 1830 1830 1830 1830 
R2 0.044 0.045 0.046 0.048 0.045 
SEE 2.70 2.70 2.70 2.70 2.70 
Note: b coefficients from OLS regression analysis with standard errors clustered by respondent in 
parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; dependent variable: the fight against climate change as an 
economic threat index (1 = no economic threat, 10 = economic threat); independent variables: ‘awareness’ 
age finished full-time education (range: 0-35 years); ‘predisposition’ left-right self-placement (0 = left, 10 = 
right); knowledge (range: 0-6 = all answers correct). 
 
 
Table 12: Adapted RAS models of attitude change test and control group with cem weights 
applied – the fight against climate change as an economic threat 
 
